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THE AUSTRALASIAN PRODUCE COOPERATIVE:  
A GLOBAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS PROJECT 
 
Hans Lehmann 
School of Information Management 





This case describes how the Australasian Produce Co-Operative1 (APCO), a marketing co-
operative in a land-based industry in ‘Australasia’ attempted to create a global information 
system.  APCO is among the 20 largest food enterprises in the world. Information systems took 
on increasing importance as the enterprise refined its global operations in the last decade.  In the 
six years between 1996 and 2002, this case demonstrates the many pitfalls in the process of 
evolving an international information system as it follows APCO’s global system development.  It 
shows the difficulties surrounding the definition of requirements in a large multinational firm and 
how such a definition is intertwined with the pre-existing politically charged environment that 
characterizes the global firm.  Further, the case demonstrates how the failure of the information 
technology department to interpret correctly the organization’s strategy changes resulted in 
antagonistic forces in which business resistance finally defeated all attempts to install a standard 
global information system.   
Keywords:  international information systems implementation, multinational companies, politics 
in multinational companies, international project management, business strategy for multinational 
companies, information systems strategy for multinational companies 
 
Editor’s Note: Faculty members who are listed in the IS Faculty Directory, located on the Web at 
http://www.isfacdir.org/default.htm can send an e-mail to the author (Hans.Lehmann@vuw.ac.nz) 
requesting the teaching note that accompanies this case. 
PREFACE 
Chris MacElroy smiled wearily at the stewardess as she cleared away the remnants of dinner and 
started to unpack the project documentation his PA had dropped into his battered briefcase 
before he left for Europe again – the third time in the last six weeks.  The meeting he was going 
to chair in London would be critical. It would determine the future (or not…) of their global 
                                                     
1 Name and location are disguised 
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information technology project, which, over five years, roundly failed to produce any systems that 
were considered useful for their business. 
He was thoroughly sick of traveling: only a week ago the executive team finished a global round 
of presentations to show-case the first annual report of the newly re-structured enterprise, which 
was successful way beyond expectations:  Revenue showed double-digit growth to more than 
$7bn2 – which now puts the Australasian Produce Co-Operative (APCO) firmly among the top ten 
global firms in their specific branch of agribusiness.   
Everything was going exceedingly well – but for the “Food Information Systems & Technology” 
(FIST) project. He looked at the project timeline which was the first item in his project file.3 Started 
with great fireworks in 1997, FIST was supposed to deliver state-of-the-art international systems 
by 2000. Alas, by that time one pilot system project had already been abandoned as unworkable; 
another was bogged down in bitter controversy; and software and hardware, selected in 1998 on 
the basis of a ‘benchmark’ study, were proving to be inadequate.  By 2001 all the major regional 
subsidiaries refused FIST as dysfunctional.  Now, in 2003, it was only a tiny office in Central Asia 
where any progress at all was made – at a cost of $25m so far.  Moreover, not only did FIST fail 
to find common systems requirements, but the resulting controversies caused bruising political 
infighting to the point where essential business co-operation was endangered.  Following a 
damning consultants’ review of the project in late 2002, the CEO pulled the plug on FIST 
altogether – although, for reasons of shareholder politics, this action was announced as a 
‘refocusing review of the project scope ’. 
How could they be so successful in their business and so hapless when it comes to information 
technology?  Chris closed the fat file and leaned back to reflect. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The marketing authorities for land-based industries (such as fruit growers, meat producers, dairy 
farmers, and forestry) started at the beginning of the last century as local co-operative producer 
associations. Over the decades they merged until, by the 1960’s, they were national bodies who 
now increasingly managed all exports of their members.  APCO4, moreover, was protected by 
legislation which prohibited any other organization in their industry from trading in international 
markets.  This legislation was seen as essential for maintaining a ‘critical mass’ in international 
markets, where APCO competes with giants such as Nestlé, which is nearly five times its size.  
Australasia’s 25,000 primary producers were organized into 38 co-operative ‘Production 
Companies’ (ProdCos), in which they held shares in proportion to their production.  APCO 
segmented their food products business into three main markets: branded fast-moving-consumer-
goods (FMCG), ingredients for industrial food manufacturers, and semi-manufactured food 
products sold to restaurant companies such as McDonalds and Burger King. 
With about a quarter of its raw materials sourced from outside Australasia, and 35 manufacturing 
plants in other countries in addition to the 25 inside Australasia, APCO soon began to regard 
itself as a mature global operator.  Structured into nine regional holding companies with 185 
offices, in 2003 it operated in some 140 countries, obtaining more than half of its revenue from 
developing countries.  Marketing, sales, and logistics, APCO’s traditional strength, were now 
often complemented by the manufacturing of branded goods at the local level.  The sophistication 
                                                     
2 All money references are in USD  
3 The project timeline is included with this case as Appendix I.  
4 APCO included both Australia and New Zealand, the two countries that, together with Papua 
New Guinea, Tasmania and a host of small islands make up the Australasian region.  
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of their operations increasingly covered a wide spectrum from small, primitive, and manual to 
large, high-tech, and fully computerized.   
A BRIEF HISTORY 
Prior to the mid 1970s APCO exported the vast majority of its produce to the United Kingdom, 
who, under Commonwealth rules, used to accept it all.  Once the UK joined the European Union, 
however, they were required to cut APCO’s quota severely.  This change brought the primary 
producers to the brink of ruin.  In emergency mode, APCO rapidly set up offices around the globe 
with a simple mandate: “Do whatever you like, but sell!”   
This policy of far-reaching local autonomy was successful.  Within a decade the Co-op built a 
presence in more than thirty countries.  Moreover, they also managed, throughout, to secure a 
satisfactory return for all their primary producers.  
By the mid-90s, however, the emergence of global brands (such as Coca Cola and McDonalds) 
forced APCO to develop global brands themselves.  For that, it needed to have sufficient 
command and control to mount synchronized international marketing and logistics operations. In 
early 1996 a new Chief Executive Officer began a vigorous campaign to shift the necessary 
authority back to head-office, but with a clear vision of balancing central control with local 
flexibility.   
Information systems were seen as an essential element of the new strategic vision.  During the 
1970s and early ‘80s, APCO built up a sizeable IS department with a mainframe operation at the 
head office, linking up with all the main subsidiary offices and ProdCos throughout Australasia.  
The forced expansion drive in the 1980s, however, led to an increased need by the local 
operations overseas to be supported with information systems.  By the mid 1990s most regional 
offices owned computers, networks, and application software to suit their own, individual 
requirements.  Compatibility with head-office and with one another was often a problem.  In 1996 
this proliferation of loosely, if at all, co-ordinated local information systems stood in some contrast 
to the declared will from APCO’s head office to impose more central control over the enterprise 
as a whole.  As a response, the IS Department at APCO’s head office established a “Standard for 
Information Systems”5, declaring the intent to impose common global standards governing the 
application and deployment of information technology throughout APCO’s operating companies 
worldwide.   
II. THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS PROJECT 
In December 1996, encouraged by the new CEO’s interest, this standards framework was 
extended to become the “Charter” for the “Food Information Systems and Technology (FIST)” 
project, charged with the specific objective to develop and implement common information 
standards, technology platforms, and global information systems for all APCO operations.  
APCO’s Board formally ratified the FIST project in January 1997.  The IS department 
consequently assembled a team, initially 11 people, all with long and good service records.  The 
team stayed relatively intact and at this size throughout the project. As a matter of policy, outside 
contractors were hired when specific skills were required. 
FIRST STEPS 
As a pre-cursor to the full project a “Business Process Benchmarking Project” was carried out at 
the Australasian head office during the first half of 1997.  The FIST team used Entity-
Relationship-Diagramming and Data-Flow-Diagrams to analyze APCO’s business operations.  
                                                     
5 The names and sentences in quotes and italics are direct citations from APCO’s internal 
documents and from interviews 
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The outcome of these deliberations was an “Enquiry To Cash (ETC)” business model, destined to 
serve as the single, globally standardized process of supply and demand management across all 
APCO subsidiaries.  The report also stated that APCO was spending approximately $ 80 million 
on information systems per annum and predicted that this budget would need to increase if 
systems were not common.   
The first project strategy and plan for FIST foresaw the following main stages: 
1. Development of a prototype system in co-operation with a site that was 
reasonably representative for most of the Group’s offices and operations; 
2. Implementation of the prototype in a small number of pilot sites; further 
adaptation of the prototype to make it functional as a global system; 
3. Gradual ‘roll-out’ of the ‘global system’ into selected regions. 
Estimated completion milestone dates were early 1998, late 1998 and late 1999 respectively. 
By the middle of 1996, the North American Region (NAR) started to embark on a review of its 
information systems.  Their old IBM system was becoming obsolete and the software was in need 
of a functional upgrade.  The South East Asia region was by then also embarking on a project to 
upgrade their fragmented PC-based installations with a more coherent information systems 
architecture to cope with the rapid growth the region was experiencing.  Both sites thus became 
natural candidates for the development of the prototype and also as pilot sites for further 
implementation: 
• North America, with its large ingredients market, would become the prototype for APCO 
offices serving this business sector; 
• APCO’s South East Asia region (SEAR), which services a large consumer market, would 
be a good prototype for all consumer and/or mixed business offices within APCO, 
especially in the lesser developed economies. 
FIST began in earnest with the dispatch of a team to North America in September of 1997. 
THE FIRST PILOT SITES: NEW YORK AND KUALA LUMPUR 
The North America Region saw the head office team as a welcome support for their upgrade and 
replacement project and they were now keen to go ahead with it as fast as possible.  The FIST 
team agreed to February 1998 (some six months hence) as the date for going live with the new 
North American system, as well as with the first global FIST pilot, which would be developed in 
parallel, “capitalizing on the significant synergies in a common ETC model”. 
At the same time Kuala Lumpur started the process of looking at their requirements. They 
expected that the FIST team would undertake this task. They were quite concerned when the 
FIST team restricted itself to comparing the ETC model they adapted for North America with 
SEAR and found “a 90 - 95% match”.  This action lead to heated discussions concerning the 
feasibility of one common business process model for the two regions, given that their markets, 
products, and business operations were entirely different.  Serious reservations were expressed 
about the generality and high-level nature of the model (“That fits everybody from the corner shop 
to Disney” was one SEAR manager’s exasperated comment).  After representations by Kuala 
Lumpur to APCO’s executive board it was agreed that SEAR would go ahead and, “for the time 
being”, carry out an “update of their existing application systems”.  The SEAR general manager 
later quietly extended the terms of reference to allow, “for the time being”, an upgrade of 
equipment “to optimize the running of the updated software”.  He was also critical of what he 
called the “top-down-approach” taken by FIST.  In return, FIST accused SEAR of bulldozing their 
proposal for an independent information systems effort through the executive board, “jeopardizing 
the global systems standard”. 
By the end of 1997, North America was thus the only pilot site.  Time pressure was beginning to 
take its toll on the management style in the project: FIST management was now actively 
discouraging user participation so that it could deliver a system by the February 1998 deadline.  
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Excluding any further NAR input, they started to drive the requirements specification 
predominantly from head office, using the ETC model as the basis for “engineering the new NAR 
and global business processes”.  In reaction, at a Finance conference in January 1998, North 
America and the other regional managers issued a strongly worded memo demanding broadly 
based involvement, to avoid wasting effort on a system which, they felt, would ultimately not 
support their business.   
FIST management complained to the CEO:  
“The finance conference has attempted to change the rules with regard to FIST. 
Prior to this, we were responsible [for developing the pilot] and we would keep 
the other regions informed.  Now it was suddenly ‘agreed’ that every man and his 
dog would be involved. The FIST timetable cannot absorb this extra involvement 
without bursting.”   
This internal memo predicted that FIST would take twice as long and cost three times as much if 
any more participation was allowed.  The CEO sided with the FIST team and issued a strongly 
worded executive circular demanding that the FIST project be “fully supported” by everyone.   
As the North America pilot project was still aiming for the February 1998 deadline, two parallel 
activity streams were developing:   
• The CEO called for a detailed cost benefit analysis.  The FIST team put together a 
justification report showing annual savings of $18m (by eliminating 200 jobs and reducing 
upgrade costs) against $33m as the total cost of global systems implementation.  
Including one-time savings of $6m, the report predicted a net-present-value of $20m over 
the next five years, with a payback of less than two years. 
• With an eye on the February 1998 deadline, the highest priority for FIST management 
was to issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) for software and hardware, to be used 
internationally as the base for the global system.   
THE GLOBAL REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL (RFP)  
A mixed team from NAR and FIST was assembled during October 1997 at APCO’s head office to 
produce a binding RFP for global software, hardware, communications and support, based on the 
‘ETC model’ as the global operations standard.  In early November, the RFP was sent to all the 
regions to comment.  The regions’ comments together with the reaction by the FIST team are 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Regional Comments and FIST Reaction 
Concerns and Comments FIST Reaction/Action 
The requirements for the Consumer and Food Service 
(together approx. 60% of APCO’s business) are not 
covered; examples of incongruences were given; 
“The comments and examples of the Europe and 
South East Asia regions were summarized and 
inserted into the RFP as an addendum”; 
The February 1998 deadline is unrealistic and un-
maintainable; 
“February 1998 remains unchanged”; 
Since the systems and technology chosen will become 
a global standard, the regions insisted strongly that 
their participation in the evaluation and selection 
process following the RFP is essential;  
“Discussion will continue to ensure that we achieve a 
reasonable balance of regional involvement without 
impacting the timetable”; 
The concept of common systems for [the Group’s] 
“core information systems” is strongly questioned 
(because of wide differences in the business) and was 
explicitly rejected by key regional management.  
A list of “core information systems” will be prepared for 
Executive agreement and “everything non-core will be 
left for the regions”. 
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Faced with this level of resistance, the FIST team once more complained to the CEO.  He sided 
with them again, driving the message home even more forcefully:  The head of the European 
Region, whose memo to the CEO was particularly critical had it returned with a handwritten 
remark “Next time you send me something like this don’t forget to attach your resignation to it”. 
Thus FIST went ahead strongly.  The RFP was finally issued in late December 1997.  Replies 
were solicited for the last week in January 1998, so that the selection could be concluded and so 
that the FIST team could put together a capital expenditure proposal in early February 1998.  
However, after every invited vendor raised strong concerns over this tight schedule for a very 
substantial RFP, the deadline was set for March 1998. 
The evaluation of the RFPs by the FIST team with some North America input was a difficult one, 
involving many calls for more information from vendors.  Eventually, in July 1998 ORACLE was 
chosen as the main provider for data base middleware and ORACLE FINANCIALS and 
INVERCROX6 (Manufacturing and Logistics) as the global applications software.  No decision 
was made on the hardware, the technical support proposals, or the communications technology. 
Back in North America, the emphasis now switched from requirements analysis to the design of 
the new system. 
THE COMMON APPLICATION SYSTEMS ISSUE 
Following on from FIST’s reply to their concerns over the global standard (Table 1), the regions in 
April 1998 asked for a clarification of what precisely the FIST team meant by ‘common 
information systems’.  FIST avoided a response initially, but eventually initiated a separate 
exercise in late 1998 and carried it out at APCO’s head office in Australasia.  As a result, a list of 
the core applications was assembled in February 1999.  In it, the core and non-core applications 
were determined according to the following definition:   
• Core applications are “those which organizations participating in FIST must 
implement in order to 
(a) manage their business to meet required goals and objectives; and 
(b) fully support the Five FIST Principles of business function placement; and  
(c) meet the information needs of other units of the APCO group of 
companies.” 
• Non-core applications are “The internal workings of processes by which some 
organizational outcomes are achieved are of no interest outside that 
organization. When an organization chooses to use an automated application to 
meet such needs, that application is considered to be non-core, no matter how 
essential it may be to the delivery of the outcome”. 
These definitions caused major discussions and brought on renewed, and ever more vociferous, 
objections from the regions, who maintained that the definition of core applications was too wide.  
The FIST Team, however, persisted with the definitions and confirmed the intended split between 
the proposed “Core”, i.e. the global standard applications, compulsory for every regional and local 
office, and the “Non-Core”, i.e. local, application systems.  The Core and Non-Core applications, 
together with an indication whether they were part of the standard FIST application packages are 
listed in Table 2.  
DEVELOPING THE NORTH AMERICA PROTOTYPE AND PILOT 
Having taken until July (and not until February 1998, as originally planned) to reach the decision 
to use the ORACLE/INVERCROX software as the Group’s standard application systems, in late 
August 1998 the FIST team could now begin with the implementation of the software in the North 
America region, and immediately encountered serious problems.   
                                                     
6 Name altered 
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Table 2. Core and Non-Core Applications within the FIST Architecture 
Core Applications Standard? Non-Core Applications Standard? 
Inventory INVERCROX Manufacturing INVERCROX 
Purchasing INVERCROX Marketing  
Sales INVERCROX Local Statutory Acct’s  
General Ledger ORACLE/FIN Fixed Assets  
Accounts Receivable ORACLE/FIN Treasury  
Accounts Payable ORACLE/FIN Payroll  
Import/Export  Project Management   
 
The INVERCROX manufacturing and distribution modules would not conform with the business 
processes they were selected to support.  The FIST team responded with setting out a policy that  
“where a choice existed between the change to business practice or a change to 
the software system, the business practice will be changed by default”.   
The North America regional manager, however, refused to change business practices which “had 
been developed in response to market and operational requirements”.  Furthermore, it turned out 
that the software changes could only be carried out by INVERCROX and were estimated to cost 
in the region of $2.5m.   
Work on the ORACLE FINANCIAL software, too, did not progress as fast as was expected.  
Internal politics within ORACLE International dictated that implementation support for NAR had to 
come from ORACLE Australasia as the contract signatory – not from ORACLE’S worldwide 
centre of excellence for financial software just across the East River from NAR’s main offices. 
Further significant systems problems also arose.  The new order processing systems, as a pivotal 
element of the common ETC process, required globally standardized product and inventory 
codes. A special sub-project was therefore set up in December 1998 to develop an integrated, 
international product code schema.  This effort, alas, turned out to be too complex for a “solution 
within the scope of the FIST project at this time”.  After six months, the sub-project was shelved in 
mid 1999 and the issue was left unresolved.   
Similar problems plagued the general accounting software suite, where another exercise was 
started in early 1999 at APCO headquarters to create a common system of account codes, 
suitable for all international subsidiaries.  This six month effort resulted in a 55-digit account 
number, with in-built logic to reflect the global chart-of-accounts.  The solution was widely 
opposed (and privately often ridiculed) by the regions.  The scheme was abandoned altogether 
after the European Region pointed out to the CEO that in most of continental Europe the chart of 
accounts is prescribed by fiscal legislation and using ‘alternative’ accounts is a felony in France 
and Germany. 
In late 1999, therefore, the FIST project was nearly two years late and some $6.5m over budget.  
To bring the project back on track, the FIST team suggested carrying out a “business-process-
reengineering (BPR)” project in North America in order to change NAR’s existing business 
processes to conform with the ETC model.  Once such a “vanilla ETC” was implemented in one 
major region, it would subsequently become the norm for all the Group’s offices and would “once 
and for all resolve continuous, disruptive and costly conflict over process details”. 
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The BPR project, however, began to go wrong at its very inception.  The FIST team insisted that 
the object of the exercise was to change North America’s business processes so that they would 
fit the ETC model.  NAR, however, was expecting a collaborative project to improve the North 
American operation.  This conflict could not be resolved and caused continuing acrimonious 
arguments between the FIST team and NAR management.  No material progress was ever made 
on the BPR project.  In mid-2000 it was abandoned altogether. 
The reason for the problems was that by mid-2000, NAR urgently needed to replace its now 
obsolete information systems and technology – four years into trying to get it upgraded.  This 
work took first priority and led to a suspension of the FIST project in North America.  The head of 
the NAR managed to reach an agreement with the CEO that the “replacement software could in 
the interim be installed so as to reflect the North America region’s requirements in the first 
instances”. 
By early 2001, North America established a stable computer system, using ORACLE FINANCIAL 
software to North American specifications.  After three more months of intensive lobbying, the 
NAR management finally wrested agreement from the CEO that they were “no longer considered 
the pilot project for FIST”. The FIST manager summed up the situation in a presentation to 
APCO’s executive board:  
“..the North America pilot...made it obvious that a global business cannot be 
streamlined from a subsidiary perspective.  It needed corporate focus, hence the 
switch back to HQ.  The time in North America was an extremely useful exercise 
to proof the software and highlight areas that needed special attention.” 
THE FIST PILOT IN TAJIKISTAN  
In mid 2001, APCO decided to open a new office in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan (once a 
Soviet Republic) to capitalize on their burgeoning trade with the former USSR and to establish 
credentials in an influential sector of the Muslim market.  With NAR a pilot site no more, the FIST 
team decided to select Dushanbe as the new pilot site to test out the common global system for 
APCO, even though the Tajikistan office “was only to have about a dozen people and probably 
does not really need to computerize any of its local operations”, as stated by the office manager. 
The ‘global standard’ (i.e. unmodified) ORACLE FINANCIAL and INVERCROX suite would be 
installed first and business procedures would be defined around the systems.  The first target 
date for completion was January 2002. 
However, for want of adequate local software and hardware support, the systems could not be 
developed on site.  It was therefore decided to develop the first prototype at the head office in 
Australasia. This decision necessitated a complicated chain of communication and logistics, as 
the local telecommunications were too unreliable for remote development operations.  The 
implementation was delayed in unpredictable ways and, by January 2002, the prototype was only 
30% finished.  Continual difficulties with implementing a computer system in an unsupported 
environment and for unskilled users (who did not really want one) delayed the implementation of 
the pilot system further, as did uncommon requirements such as the effects of Islamic banking 
procedures on accounting processes.  A much reduced ‘pilot’, the General Accounts suite, was 
eventually handed over as a working system in September 2002. 
FIST publicized this ‘achievement’ as a great success and announced that they intended to use it 
as a model for FIST implementation in other small offices:   
“In 2003…Hong Kong, South Africa, the Philippines and mainland China will be 
next on the list”. 
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DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING FIST AT HEAD OFFICE AND AT OTHER REGIONS 
The major difficulties with the FIST project eventually began to attract the attention of the CEO, 
who began to change his attitude towards it.  He was especially alarmed about the significant 
costs.  By the end of 2001, FIST cost about $25m, had missed every deadline and had not 
delivered any noticeable benefits. 
Previously, the FIST team always managed to convince the CEO that the main obstructions to 
FIST were essentially a “political’” response to his strategic moves towards re-establishing central 
control over the regions, requiring nothing more than “a show of strength and a determination 
right from the top [not to tolerate] any more games”.  Although the CEO repeatedly pointed out to 
the FIST team that his strategy was not a return to central control, he let himself be persuaded to 
become FIST’s “major sponsor” and to issue draconian edicts to the regions to support FIST.  
The NAR manager never knew how close he came to being sacked or demoted because of his 
refusal to adopt the ETC version of the FIST-Prototype.  Even executives at head office began to 
regard any criticism of FIST as “a possible career-limiting move”.   
In spite of this atmosphere, the regions were distancing themselves even further from the project.  
The manager in charge of the Europe Region, an old school friend of the NAR manager and 
therefore best informed about the problems with FIST, began covertly to canvass support for a 
decisive move at the next regional executive meeting, which the CEO always chaired.  Europe 
region had the most advanced information systems, set-up to support their sophisticated 
manufacturing and marketing operations in the UK and on the continent, as well as the steepest 
technology differentials across the region. In Egypt, for example, carbon-paper in mechanical 
typewriters was still at the heart of their business processes.  Europe shared this broad spectrum 
of process sophistication with Latin America, whose virtually paperless head office in Miami 
presided over local offices in anything from huts in the pampas (albeit with satellite telephones) to 
sprawling low-tech manufacturing facilities in Mexico City.  Between them, Europe and NAR 
started to build political support for a motion at the meeting that would force a corporate re-think 
about FIST. 
The motion was presented to the meeting in July 2002 and accepted on the spot.  The concerted 
and continuing rejection of FIST by his most able and trusted lieutenants eventually began to 
seed strong doubts in the CEO.  The move by the regions pointed to a way out of the situation 
without loss of face for him.  In August 2002 Deloitte Consulting were commissioned to evaluate 
FIST, the ETC, and all the other related projects.   
The Deloitte report, issued in November 2002 was fairly noncommittal, even mildly complimentary 
and set out very positive recommendations, in the version for public consumption.  The 
“Executive Working Paper”, confidential to the CEO and a select group of regional executives, 
however, was scathingly critical of all the FIST projects as being overly ambitious, technically 
doubtful, and unjustifiable from a business perspective.  Deloitte deemed FIST as simply not 
achievable, neither within the stipulated time frame nor with the resources at hand, or through the 
existing centralized project structure.   
The Deloitte report proved to be a turning point. In APCO’s executive Board meeting of 
December 20, 2002 the CEO re-assigned the whole IT portfolio - and with it the FIST project - to 
Chris McElroy.  As the CFO, Chris was one of the few outspoken and open critics of the project.   
Advocating that business reasons, not global technology standards should convince APCO into 
spending $25m, he called for a critical review of FIST as early as March 2002. 
In rapid succession the FIST project manager and deputy manager resigned.   
III. THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 
McElroy smiled thinly as he recalled the “sincere condolences” card he had received from the 
Europe regional manager upon the news that he “inherited” the IT portfolio.  But, he thought, if 
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nothing else, this whole sorry episode should jolt the CEO and the head office executive into 
taking IT seriously.  He always cringed when one or other of the directors declared – with inverted 
pride, it seemed - that “these computers are a complete mystery to me”.   
Getting them off their farm bikes and onto a computer was one thing he would put on his agenda 
first off, he mused.  The other key priority would be to focus on healing the serious rifts that 
developed as a result of the vicious politics FIST engendered. 
But what to do about FIST itself?  All misgivings about the project aside, is there or is there not a 
real need for some more co-ordination, co-operation and synergy between all these diverse 
computer systems?  And if there is – how would one do something about it? 
McElroy now regretted that he didn’t invite the head of the Deloitte review team (who impressed 
him as a seasoned professional with lots of common sense) to help him with the London meeting.  
He decided to get them involved, first thing, upon his return. 
Author’s Note: The case is based on the history of an international information systems project in a real 
enterprise.  It was, however, simplified, altered, and adapted (by omission of detail) for use as an 
instructional case.  For this reason the enterprise requested to remain anonymous. Names, places and 
temporal references were changed to disguise the enterprise.  The author wishes to express his sincere 
thanks for the open, helpful, and extended co-operation he received from “APCO” management and staff 
around the globe. 
Editor’s Note: This case was received on August 10, 2003. It was with the author for 2 months for 2 
revisions.  It was published on March 21, 2004.  
APPENDIX 1.TIMELINE OF THE FIST PROJECT 
Time Project Activity 
Early 1996 The new CEO introduces the new ‘transnational’ strategy of introducing 
more central control over synchronized international marketing and 
logistics operations. 
Mid 1996 North America Region (NAR) reviews its aging IBM system. NAR is 
chosen as ‘prototype’ site. 
South East Asia Region (SEAR) needs to upgrade their fragmented PC-
based installation to cope with rapid regional growth.   
December 1996 to 
January 1997 
IS Department at APCO’s head office establishes the common global 
‘Standard for Information Systems’ which becomes the ‘Charter’ for FIST, 
the global project launched in January 1997. FIST Budget (for full global 
implementation) is set at a cost of $35 million, supported by projected 
benefits (predominantly clerical workforce savings) of $60 million 
Early to Mid 1997 ‘Business Process Benchmarking Project’ to develop the Enquiry To Cash 
(ETC) concept prototype for all global business operations is carried out by 
the FIST team at APCO’s head office.  
Mid 1997 Both NAR and SEAR are chosen as pilot sites for FIST. A project team 
starts work at the NAR head office. ‘Going-live’ date for the NAR pilot 
system is set for February 1998. 
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Time Project Activity 
Late 1997 FIST decides that SEAR will use the NAR pilot. A ‘Requirements 
Benchmark’ comparison project between NAR and SEAR finds a 90-95% 
match.  SEAR points out it is in different markets with different products 




A mixed team of NAR and FIST issues a global Request for Proposal 
(RFP) using the ETC model as the basis for “engineering the new NAR 
and global business processes” This proposal invokes strong criticism 
from regional management, which the CEO strongly discourages. He 
issues a strong edict to the regions to “fully support the project” 
December 1997 RFP is issued virtually unchanged to selected vendors; a deadline for RFP 
replies is set for January 1998, so that the selection of global technology 
may still be completed by February 1998 (the original deadline for ‘going-
live’ with the NAR pilot).  Most vendors object to the tight deadline 
January 1998 At the APCO Group Finance conference all heads of the regions demand 
involvement in FIST, which is refuted by FIST management; CEO sides 
again with FIST and re-issues an even stronger edict to the regions to 
“fully support the project[- or else]” 
March 1998 Three vendor proposals are received for evaluation by the FIST. 
April 1998 Regions demand explanation of what the “core information systems” are 
that were mentioned in FIST’s reply to the regions concerns in January 
1998 
July 1998 RFP’s were evaluated and global standard technology is selected, based 
on applications software from ORACLE and INVERCROX.  No hardware 
platform, support organisations, or communications vendors are selected; 
Late 1998 INVERCROX functionality does not fit NAR business processes.  FIST 
demands NAR change their business practices.  NAR management 
refuses. 
ORACLE insists on supporting the NAR pilot from its Australasian office, 
not from its North America base in the same city as the NAR offices 
“International Integrated Product Code” project started to harmonise all the 
different (regional) product codes; 
Early 1999 “Common Chart of Accounts” project launched to standardise the widely 
different accounting structures used by APCO’s international subsidiaries 
February 1999 FIST issues a definition of “core” and “non-core” information systems; 
regional management unite in their objections to the scope of “core” 
systems 
Mid 1999 “International Integrated Product Code” project abandoned as being too 
complex for a “solution within the scope of the FIST project at this time”;  
“Common Chart of Accounts” project abandoned: in most of continental 
Europe the chart of accounts is prescribed by fiscal legislation and using 
‘alternative’ accounts is a felony in France and Germany. 
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Time Project Activity 
Late 1999 FIST Project Costs exceed budget-to-date by $6.5 million. 
“Business-Process-Reengineering (BPR)” project launched as a formal 
process to change NAR’s existing business processes to conform with the 
ETC model 
Early 2000 NAR management oppose the BPR project; no progress is made on the 
FIST pilot system while the discussions go on between NAR, FIST, and 
the CEO 
Mid 2000 NAR’s old IBM system is now obsolete and cannot be supported beyond 
the end of 2000;  NAR management reaches an agreement with the CEO 
that the “replacement software could in the interim be installed so as to 
reflect the North America region’s requirements in the first instances” 
Early 2001 NAR goes live on a new IBM platform, using ORACLE FINANCIALS to 
NAR specifications.  CEO agrees that they are “no longer considered the 
pilot project for FIST” 
Mid 2001 APCO open the Dushanbe (Tajikistan) office.  FIST declare Dushanbe as 
the new FIST global pilot site. ‘Global Standard’ (i.e. unmodified) ORACLE 
FINANCIAL and INVERCROX suites will be installed and business 
procedures will be defined around the software.  Completion deadline is 
January 2002 
January 2002 FIST Project costs stand at $25 million as at end 2001. 
Dushanbe ‘Global Standard’ pilot (developed at APCO head office for want 
of adequate local software and hardware support) is now 30% complete.  
New completion deadline: June 2002   
June to September 
2002 
After the June deadline is missed, requirements for the Dushanbe pilot 
system are reduced to a kernel of “General Accounting” software. The pilot 
system ‘goes live’ in September 2002 
July/August 2002 Europe and NAR regional management present a motion to the Regional 
Executive meeting that FIST be reviewed and suspended for the duration 
of the review;  CEO accepts the motion and commissions Deloitte 
Consulting to review and evaluate FIST 
November 2002 Deloitte Consulting report to CEO:  “FIST is overly ambitious, technically 
doubtful, unjustifiable from a business perspective, and unachievable 
within timeframe”;  
December 2002 CEO and APCO’s executive board re-assign the FIST project to come 
under the CFO. Management of FIST resigns. Scope of FIST changed to 
the “development of a global information systems strategic plan”.; 
 
 
 232                          Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 13, 2004)220-232             
 
The Australian Produce Co-Operative; A Global Information Systems Project by H. Lehmann 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Abbreviation Explanation 
APCO Australasian Produce Co-Operative 
BPR “Business-Process-Reengineering” project launched as a formal 
process to change NAR’s existing business processes to conform 
with the ETC model 
ETC the ‘Enquiry To Cash’ concept prototype for all global business 
operations 
FIST ‘Food Information Systems and Technology’ project to create a 
global information system for APCO; the term is used 
interchangeably for the project as well as its management   
FMCG Fast-Moving-Consumer-Goods  
NAR APCO’s North America Region  
ProdCos ‘Production Companies’; the 38 production co-operatives in which 
Australasia’s 25,000 primary producers held shares in proportion 
to their production.  The ProdCos, in turn, hold shares in APCO, 
in proportion to their production 
SEAR APCO’s South East Asia Region  
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